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 Mutual Holding Companies:   
Evidence of Conflicts of Interest through Disparate Dividends 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The mutual holding company (MHC) structure establishes a dual-class stock that creates 
a unique opportunity to transfer wealth from thrift depositor-owners to new minority 
shareholders through the disparate payment of dividends.  We show that MHCs are 
priced higher than comparable non-MHCs and dividend policy is a significant component 
of this valuation.  We also show that MHC thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than 
non-MHC thrifts and that an Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) ruling reducing the 
potential for disparate dividends between the two classes of shareholders resulted in 
lower dividends.  These results have policy implications of special significance given that 
the OTS reversed its position in 2000 and because of the current controversy over the use 
of the MHC structure in the financial service industry. 
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Evidence of Conflicts of Interest through Disparate Dividends 
 
 
The conversion of mutual thrifts to stock companies has led to controversy and 
concern over the potential transfer of wealth from depositor-owners to new shareholders 
(Masulis (1987), Kroszner and Strahan (1996), Unal (1997), Cagle and Porter (1997), and 
Cox and Roden (1999)).  We demonstrate and test how dividend policy transfers wealth 
in a mutual holding company (MHC).  Recent experience in the mutual thrift industry, 
which includes two distinct regulatory regimes, provides an opportunity to investigate the 
MHC ownership structure and develop an effective regulatory model for thrift and 
insurance MHCs. 
In a traditional full demutualization 100 percent of the company is sold to new 
shareholders.  In contrast, when a MHC is used, the maximum amount of stock issued to 
public shareholders is 49.9%, while the remaining majority shares are owned by the 
newly created holding company.  The original thrift depositors jointly own the MHC and 
thus own a controlling share of the thrift.  However, individual depositors cannot access 
the accumulated equity or exercise direct control.      
The conversion of a mutual company to a stock company can be controversial 
even when the MHC ownership structure is not used.  Proponents of conversions claim 
that demutualizations raise cash and facilitate future access to capital markets.  However, 
in a mutual, no traditional owners exist to argue for full market price during a conversion 
to a stock company.  As a result, there are skewed economic incentives and clear 
opportunities to set a low price at the initial public offering (IPO).  The new shareholders 
are often able to purchase their shares at discounted prices that rise dramatically 
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subsequent to the IPO.  Masulis (1987), Kroszner and Strahan (1996), and Unal (1997) 
show that stock appreciation on the offer day is related to the pre-conversion value of the 
thrift that is distributed to the initial investors who purchase the equity of the converting 
thrift.  If insiders purchase a disproportionate amount of the offering, insiders may be 
able to enhance their wealth at the expense of depositor-owners. 
The use of disparate dividends may provide another opportunity to transfer wealth 
from MHC depositor-owners to minority shareholders.  Mutual thrifts are prohibited from 
paying cash dividends or making capital distributions to depositor-owners (Kroszner and 
Strahan (1996)).  Prior to 1995, when MHC thrifts paid a dividend to minority 
shareholders, the holding company would simply waive its portion of the dividend.  Such 
disparate dividend distributions increase the value of minority shares that receive 
dividends at the expense of MHC owners who do not receive dividends.  To address this 
concern, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) passed regulations in 1995 requiring that 
minority shareholders have their ownership proportionately decreased when a MHC 
waives its right to dividend payment.  The OTS ruling compensates MHC owners with 
increased proportional ownership and addresses the concerns that minority shareholders 
are unduly enriched by dividend payments. 1 
Our study examines a sample of thrifts that underwent either traditional full 
demutualizations (non-MHC) or used a MHC to convert to a stock company.  We find 
that MHC thrifts pay significantly higher dividends than non-MHCs.  The MHCs are also 
priced higher than comparable non-MHC firms and dividend policy is a significant 
component of this valuation.  We also find evidence that the OTS ruling in 1995 reduced 
                                               
1 Both the OTS and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC) expressed similar 
concerns in the American Banker Washington Watch, May 15, 1995. 
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the incentives for MHCs to pay higher dividends.  Our findings show that dividends paid 
by MHC thrifts and their stock price premium relative to non-MHCs were significantly 
reduced after the 1995 regulatory change.  The results have clear regulatory implications 
that are particularly important since the OTS reversed its dividend policy in July 2000.  
The current OTS policy once more allows MHC thrifts to waive their dividends without 
requiring a compensating decrease in the minority shareholders’ ownership, resulting in a 
renewed opportunity for the transfer of wealth from MHC depositor-owners to minority 
shareholders.  Event study results, surrounding OTS rulings involving MHC dividend 
policy, are also consistent with wealth expropriation through dividend policy.   
Section I of this paper summarizes the history of thrift conversions and their 
regulation. Section II discusses the incentives for dividend behavior, draws implications 
for firm value during different regulatory regimes, and specifies our hypotheses.  These 
implications are tested in Section III, where we describe our empirical methods and the 
results of our analysis of dividend behavior and firm value.  Section IV summarizes our 
findings and concludes with policy implications. 
 
I. Background of Conversions and Their Regulation 
 
A.  Traditional Demutualizations 
 
Originally, most mutual thrift institutions began as local cooperatives where 
members pooled their savings to finance home mortgages.  Mutual thrift managers and 
directors assert that converting to a publicly traded company strengthens the institution 
by increasing capital and improving access to capital markets.  Kroszner and Strahan 
(1996) observe that regulators encouraged capital-impaired thrifts to convert to stock 
organizations during the 1980s to bring new capital into the cash-starved industry.  
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Additionally, stockholder scrutiny and equity incentives may enhance incentives to 
improve performance.     
In contrast, the lack of the usual tension between buyers and sellers has led some 
industry observers to claim that thrift insiders are unjustly enriched.  Because mutual 
thrifts have no clear owners, no shareholders exist to argue for full market price during a 
conversion to a stock company.  This results in skewed economic incentives and 
opportunities for thrift insiders to profit from setting a low price in the IPO.  Unal (1997) 
and Krozner and Strahan (1996) show that the initial stockholders in a conversion buy the 
capital that they invested, growth opportunities from the new capital, and the pre-
conversion value of a demutualizing thrift.  Maksimovic and Unal (1993), assert that 
insiders have incentives to influence offer size to obtain a higher offer-day return.  They 
show that greater insider participation is associated with smaller offering amounts, 
resulting in lower offer prices and larger offer-day returns.   
B.  Conversions Using a Mutual Holding Company Ownership Structure  
Congress first authorized mutual holding companies in the Competitive Equality 
Banking Act of 1987.  The MHC ownership structure is a special case of dual-class stock.  
The MHC privately holds one class of stock and minority stockholders publicly own a 
second class.  A MHC structure permits public shareholders to obtain up to 49.9% of the 
company shares.  These minority shares are publicly held but have restricted voting 
rights.  As expressed in Hudson City Bancorp’s proxy statement, “No cumulative voting 
means that Hudson City MHC, as the holder of a majority of the shares voted at a 
meeting of stockholders, may elect all directors of Hudson City Bancorp to be elected at 
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that meeting. This could prevent public stockholder representation on Hudson City 
Bancorp's Board of Directors.”   
The MHC, which is jointly owned by depositors, holds the majority of shares.  
Without a strong participatory depositor base, MHC managers and directors effectively 
control the thrift.  In effect, the MHC structure allows for the benefits of conversion to a 
stock company (immediate cash infusion, access to capital markets, managerial 
incentives, etc.), while allowing insider retention of control.    
Earlier studies of dual-class stock document that shares with superior voting 
rights trade at a higher price than shares with inferior voting rights (Lease, McConnell, 
and Mikkelson (1983), Megginson (1990), Zingales (1995), Rydqvist (1996), and Chung 
and Kim (1999)).  However, Cox and Roden (2002) find that preferential dividend 
promises to low-vote shareholders reduce the voting premium, providing evidence that 
voting rights can be priced and purchased with preferential dividends.   
Mutual thrifts are prohibited from paying cash dividends or making capital 
distributions to the depositor-owners.  However, stock thrifts operate like other 
corporations and may pay dividends to their stockholders.  Since the MHC ownership 
structure is a hybrid between the two, it presents unique incentive problems.  Minority 
stockholders can receive dividends, but the MHC owners cannot.  If dividends are paid to 
one group of owners and not the other, opportunities exist to transfer wealth. 
Our study is not the first to evaluate conflicts of interest in thrift dividend policy.  
Kroszner and Strahan (1996) state that the dividend policies of thrifts received little 
regulatory attention prior to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) in 1991.  Unlike commercial banks, thrifts faced no explicit legislative 
 8 
restraints on dividend payments relative to capital or earnings.  Kroszner and Strahan 
document that in this pre-FDICIA environment, insolvent and thinly capitalized thrifts 
continued to pay and even increase dividends during periods of cash shortage.  Unlike 
most unregulated non-financial firms, which rely on provisions in debt contracts to 
restrict dividend policy, the thrift industry relies on government-insured deposits, that 
until FDICIA, lacked constraints on dividend payments.   
Regulators did not pay specific attention to the dividend payments of thrift MHCs 
until 1995.  Prior to 1995, when a MHC paid a dividend to the minority shareholders, the 
holding company waived its portion of the dividend with no compensating adjustment to 
its ownership share.  Not only did the minority stockholders receive their share of the 
thrift’s earnings in the form of dividends, but they retained their percentage claim to the 
retained earnings that increased due to the waiver of the holding company’s dividends.  
In 1995, the OTS passed a regulation requiring that the holding company ownership share 
of the company increase proportionately by the value of the waived dividends.  This OTS 
policy effectively dilutes the minority shareholders’ ownership percentage by the value of 
the dividends waived by the MHC. 
The OTS reversed this position in July 2000 to make the mutual holding company 
structure more attractive as an alternative to full conversion.  The policy reversal again 
allows MHC thrifts to waive dividends without requiring compensating minority 
shareholder dilution.  The OTS argued that fear of such dilution caused a number of 
institutions to fully convert to stock form rather than remain as MHCs. 2 
                                               
2 When a MHC fully demutualizes, it is referred to as a second-stage conversion.  In a 
second-stage conversion, the shares held by the public shareholders are exchanged for 
shares of a “new” holding company.  Additional shares of the “new” holding company 
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II. Incentives for Dividend Behavior and Implications for Firm Value 
 
Prior to the 1995 OTS ruling that restricted dividends, there was opportunity to 
transfer wealth from the MHC depositor-owners to the minority shareholders.  Table I 
provides an example to illustrate this potential wealth transfer and the intended impact of 
the 1995 OTS regulation.  The first column shows a thrift that is fully demutualized and 
has two shares of stock.  The thrift pays a $0.25 per share dividend ($0.50 total) in each 
of four years and at the end of the fifth year the company is liquidated at a value of $20.  
Given this set of cash flow assumptions and a 10 percent discount rate, the present value 
of this fully demutualized firm is $7.00 per share.  The second set of columns shows an 
economically identical firm using a mutual holding company structure.  For simplicity, 
we assume that 50 percent of the thrift is held by the MHC and 50 percent held by the 
“minority” shareholders.  Thus, the holding company owns one share and the “minority” 
shareholders own one share.  A dividend is again declared at $0.25 per share, but the 
MHC waives its rights to receive the dividend, resulting in a dividend of $0.25 per share 
only for the “minority” shareholders.  Under the OTS regulations prior to 1995, the thrift 
does not need to make adjustment to the ownership share of the firm.  In five years, when 
the firm is liquidated, the MHC owners and the minority shareholders share equally in the 
buyout price of the firm (which is increased by the future value of the waived dividends).  
This simplified example illustrates that while the “minority” shareholders receive 50 
                                                                                                                                            
are offered to the members of the mutual holding company and to the public in 
accordance with the plan of conversion.  The only way to participate in the second-stage 
conversion is to purchase shares at the offer price.  Thus, “ownership” in the mutual 
holding company does not imply that the mutual’s eligible account holders will be paid 
the value of their ownership; it only provides eligible account holders the opportunity to 
purchase additional shares at the subscription price.   
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percent of the value of the firm at liquidation; their total cash flows ultimately equal 53 
percent of the economic value of the firm.  The “minority” shareholders will value their 
stock at a premium price of $7.40 per share compared to $7.00 per share for the fully 
demutualized firm. 3  When waived dividends do not decrease ownership share for 
minority shareholders, wealth will be transferred from the MHC depositor-owners.  The 
illustrated wealth transfer would be magnified if the level of dividends or the length of 
time until liquidation were increased.    
In the third set of columns, we demonstrate the impact of the 1995 ruling 
requiring that MHC depositor-owners be credited with a compensating increase in equity 
ownership.  Through the greater proportionate ownership at liquidation, the MHC owners 
are able to retain 50 percent of the economic value of the firm.  However, in practice, if 
the OTS does not require adjustments for the time value of money or is lax in 
enforcement, the MHC owners will not be fully compensated.  
The unique nature of the MHC ownership structure provides incentives for thrift 
insiders to take advantage of opportunities to transfer wealth as illustrated above.  Given 
that management compensation may be based on the value of the publicly traded 
minority shares, managers have incentives to establish dividend policies consistent with 
the interests of minority shareholders.  In addition, thrift insiders purchase public shares 
and benefit from the payment of dividends. 
Based on the previous literature and the regulatory changes, we develop seven 
hypotheses.  The first three hypotheses are based on the MHCs incentives to pay 
dividends.   
                                               
3 The resulting premium relative to the non-MHC is 6 percent [($7.40/$7.00) – 1]. 
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Hypothesis 1:  MHCs are more likely to pay dividends than non-MHCs. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  MHC dividends are higher than the dividends of non-MHCs. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Following the OTS policy restricting dividend waivers, MHCs    
reduce their level of dividends. 
 
Given the expected effect of divided policy on MHC stock prices, we posit 
hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Hypothesis 4:  The stock values of public offerings of MHC thrifts are reduced by 
OTS restrictions on dividend waivers. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The level of dividends is directly related to the stock value of the 
MHC. 
 
The regulatory announcement by the OTS also provides an opportunity to test for 
wealth effects through the implementation of event-study methodology.  Analyzing stock 
prices, we posit hypotheses 6 and 7. 
Hypothesis 6:  The stock prices of MHCs decrease surrounding the 1995 OTC 
ruling restricting dividend waivers. 
 
Hypothesis 7:  The stock price of MHCs increase surrounding the 2000 OTC 
ruling allowing dividend waivers. 
 
 
Empirical Methods and Results 
This study examines a sample of thrifts that converted using either a traditional 
full demutualization (non-MHCs) or a MHC ownership structure.  The dividend behavior 
and firm value are analyzed under regulatory regimes before and after the 1995 OTS 
ruling.  
 A. Sample Selection 
The sample is composed of mutual thrifts that performed an initial public offering 
from 1988 to 2000.  Our initial sample was identified by searching the SNL DataSource 
 12 
and SNL Securities Monthly Market Report and includes 64 MHCs and 329 thrifts that 
fully demutualized at the time of their initial public offering.  SNL DataSource and SNL 
Securities Monthly Market Report provide information concerning the pro-forma 
financial statements, insider holdings, offer price, proceeds, and change in price for the 
first trading date for both mutual holding company conversions and traditional full 
demutualizations.4  Additional information, including the thrift’s first regular dividend 
payment, is gathered from CRSP, Dow Jones Interactive, Edgar reports, and the FDIC 
database.  The final sample that requires availability of all data includes 61 MHCs and 
311 full demutualizations.    
B. Results 
B.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table II provides a summary of the sample by years.  Despite a fairly stable 
number of full demutualizations in 1995 and 1996, the number of MHC conversions 
declines over this time period.  The increase in MHC conversions just prior to the 1995 
OTS ruling and the subsequent drop in MHC conversions in 1995 and 1996 provide the 
first evidence that the OTS ruling, requiring that dividends waived by MHCs be used to 
decrease the ownership share of minority shareholders, reduced the attractiveness of the 
MHC structure.5 
                                               
4 Nineteen MHCs are from the SNL Securities Monthly Market Report.  Each of these 
companies fully converted to a stock company subsequent to its initial public offering.  
When a MHC undergoes a second-stage conversion, SNL DataSource does not retain the 
original conversion information in their database.  Unlike SNL DataSource, SNL 
Securities Monthly Market Report does not always include measures of pro-forma ROA 
and capital ratios.  For these observations we obtained ROA and capital ratios from the 
company’s SEC filings.   
5 Five of the six MHC conversions in 1995 occurred prior to the OTS publishing their 
ruling in May.  While the number of MHC conversions decreased in 1995 and 1996 
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Table III provides a summary of the sample characteristics of mutual thrifts that 
converted to stock companies from 1988 to 2000.  In addition to pre-conversion data, 
pro-forma data is used to reflect the expected impact of the offering.  Approximately 79 
percent of both non-MHCs and MHCs trade on the NASDAQ exchange.   The average 
pre-conversion assets of thrifts using the mutual holding company structure is $644 
million compared to $343 million for thrifts that chose full demutualizations.  While 
MHC firms are nearly twice as large as non-MHCs, the average conversion proceeds are 
higher for thrifts that execute full conversions.  This is because MHCs sell, on average, 
only 41 percent of the thrift to new shareholders while the non-MHCs sell 100 percent of 
the company in a full demutualization.  The average pre-conversion equity-to-assets ratio 
is 7.8% for non-MHCs and 9.7% for MHCs.  However, due to the greater proportional 
level of ownership sold during traditional full demutualizations, the average pro-forma 
equity-to-assets ratio is 22 percent for non-MHCs and 14.6 percent for MHCs.6   
                                                                                                                                            
following the ruling, we do not find a significant reduction in full demutualizations over 
the same period.   The renewed popularity of MHC conversions beginning in 1998 may 
be due to two rulings passed by the OTS in 1997 and 1998.  In August of 1997, the OTS 
simplified conversion to the MHC structure and in March of 1998, the OTS authorized a 
new three-tier MHC structure.  Neither of these rulings altered the OTS policy on 
dividends. 
6 A logitistic model of the decision to choose a MHC vs. a non-MHC was also 
considered.  Analysts suggest that MHCs may have less growth potential and suffer from 
poor performance due to agency problems.  We collected income and balance sheet data 
prior to the IPO and found no significant relation between firm performance, capital 
levels, or growth.  Given that both firms are expected to be capital constrained prior to 
the transaction, a lack of significant differences is not surprising.  Subsequent to the 
offering, we do find that non-MHCs grow faster.  This is consistent with their larger 
capital acquisition at the IPO.  However, subsequent to the conversions, ROA and 
efficiency ratios suggest that MHCs may have done a better job at putting their new 
assets to work. We find no evidence that CEO compensation at MHCs exceeds that at 
non-MHCs.      
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B.2. Dividend Policy 
In this subsection, we determine how the dividend policies of mutual holding 
companies differ from the dividend policies of fully demutualized thrifts.  We also show 
how MHC dividend policy changes subsequent to the OTS ruling requiring that the value 
of waived dividends decrease the ownership of minority shareholders.   
Table IV contains preliminary statistics concerning the dividend policies of non-
MHCs and MHCs.  Consistent with hypothesis 1, MHCs are more likely to issue 
dividends.  93.4 percent of MHCs pay dividends within the first year after their initial 
stock offering, compared to 73.6 percent of non-MHCs.  For each thrift, we annualize the 
company’s first declared dividend and divide it by the company’s book value per share.  
The estimation of dividend yield is consistent with Ohlson (1995), who states that 
dividends are paid out of the book value of the firm and, as a result, dividend payments 
reduce firm market value on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 7  The average dividend yield for the 
MHCs (3.33%) is more than twice that of non-MHCs (1.43%).  To further test the 
difference in the level of dividends, we limit the sample by excluding firms that did not 
pay any dividends.  The sample of MHCs falls to 57 and the sample of non-MHCs is 
reduced to 229 observations.  The dividend yield for MHCs (3.56%) remains 
significantly higher than the dividend yield of non-MHCs that pay dividends (1.94%), 
providing preliminary evidence in support of hypothesis 2.   
                                               
7 Other dividend ratios were also considered.  If price is a function of dividends, dividing 
dividends by the offer price or the price at the close of the first date would bias the 
results.  In place of market prices, dividends are divided by the book value of equity.  We 
also tested the dividend-to-assets ratio and a dividend payout ratio.  For the dividend 
payout ratio, we omit firms that had negative earnings and we restrict the upper limit of 
this variable to be equal to 100.   Similar cross-sectional results are found when using 
these alternative definitions.     
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The results of the cross-sectional tests to explain dividend policies are presented 
in Table V.  The dependent variable is equal to the dividend yield, defined as the 
annualized dividend in the first year after the demutualization divided by the book value 
per share.  Similar to previous studies by Kroszner and Strahan (1996), Casey and 
Dickens (2000) and Collins, Blackwell, and Sinkey (1994), the cross-sectional 
regressions control for the firm’s earnings (ROA), capital (equity-to-assets), and size (log 
of assets).  To test hypothesis 2, model 1 also includes an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm is a MHC and zero otherwise.  Consistent with prior literature, our control 
variables show that capital is positively related to the level of dividends.  For our 
hypothesis variable, we find that the dividend yield of MHCs is 2.03 percent higher than 
the dividend yield of non-MHCs.   
In 1995, the OTS reduced the incentives for MHCs to issue dividends by 
requiring that the value of waived dividends be used to decrease the ownership of the 
minority shareholders.  To test hypothesis 3, model 2 adds an indicator variable equal to 
one if the firm used a MHC structure and the initial stock offering was made after 
February 1, 1995 and zero otherwise.  Subsequent to the OTS ruling, we find that new 
MHCs pay significantly lower dividends.  Prior to February 1, 1995, the average dividend 
yield of MHCs was 3.16 percent higher than non-MHCs.  However, MHCs making an 
initial stock offering subsequent to February 1995 had an average dividend yield 1.76 
percent lower than earlier MHCs and a dividend yield 1.40 (3.16 – 1.76) percent higher 
than non-MHCs.  F-test results reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two indicator 
variables is equal to zero.  This shows that MHCs that went public after the OTS ruling in 
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1995 still pay dividends that are significantly higher that non-MHC thrifts but their 
dividends are significantly lower than those of MHCs formed prior to the ruling.    
To further ensure that the test statistics are not simply differentiating between the 
percent of companies that pay dividends, Model 3 in Table V omits from the analysis any 
non-MHCs that did not pay any dividends.  This restriction eliminates 4 MHCs and 82 
non-MHCs from the third model, reducing the sample to 286 observations.  Prior to 
February 1995, the average dividend yield of MHCs was 2.50 percent higher than non-
MHCs.  Subsequent to February 1995, MHCs undergoing an initial stock offering 
reduced their dividend yield by 1.32 percent compared to their predecessors.  MHCs still 
have a dividend yield 1.18 (2.50 – 1.32) percent higher than non-MHCs.  Once again, F-
test results reject the hypothesis that the sum of the two indicator variables is equal to 
zero.   
The previous analysis focused on differences across firms.  In the following table, 
we focus a within-firm test of dividend policy, by testing if established MHCs change 
their dividend policy subsequent to the OTS ruling in 1995.  We restrict the sample to 
firms with at least one complete year of dividend information prior to February 1, 1995 
and one complete year of dividend information after February 1, 1995.  The sample 
ultimately includes 8 MHCs and 42 non-MHCs. 8 Table VI shows that relative to the level 
of dividend payments in the year prior to the new OTS dividend waiver policy, non-MHC 
thrifts are more likely than MHCs to increase dividends in the subsequent year and 
                                               
8 In order to obtain consistent reporting of when dividends were paid relative to the OTS 
enforcement date, the sample was restricted to thrifts that implemented their dividend 
policy by early 1994 and have data available on CRSP.  If the firm paid semi-annually 
(quarterly, annually) prior to February 1, 1995 we also required the firm to pay semi-
annually (quarterly, annually) after February 1, 1995.   
 17 
MHCs are more likely than non-MHCs to decrease dividends.  These findings provide 
further support for hypothesis 3, showing that the incentive for MHCs to pay dividends 
decreased subsequent to the OTS ruling.  This result is particularly interesting given that 
the OTS grandfathered firms under their new dividend policy.  Thus, these firms were not 
required to compensate MHC shareholders with an increasing portion of the stock when 
dividends were paid to minority shareholders. 
  The results in this section provide evidence that MHCs pay significantly higher 
dividends than non-MHCs (hypothesis 1 and 2).  Furthermore, restrictions on dividend 
policy by the OTS significantly reduce the incentives for MHCs to pay higher dividends 
(hypothesis 3).   
B.3.  Firm Value 
When determining depository institution pricing, Rhoades (1987) Cheng, Gup, 
and Wall (1989), Rogowski and Simonson (1989), Frieder and Petty (1991), Rose (1991), 
Palia (1993), Fraser and Kolari (1988), Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996), and Brewer, 
Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2000) each use a measure of the firm’s market price 
divided by its book value.9  In this section, we utilize the price-to-book ratio to 
demonstrate how the value of converting thrifts differs based on the form of conversion 
and dividend policy. 10 
                                               
9 For MHCs, the number of shares outstanding includes the shares held by minority 
stockholders and the shares held by the MHC.  Using the number of shares outstanding 
assumes that there is no discrepancy between the pricing of the two dual classes of stock 
for MHCs.  Our null hypothesis assumes no price discrepancy based on dividend policy. 
10 Regulators commonly use three equations to estimate the value of a converting thrift.  
These equations provide three pricing ratios: price-to-book, price-earnings, and price-to-
assets.  Unal (1997) provides a critical review of the fundamental flaws in the regulatory 
appraisal equations that were used to estimate the value of a thrift converting from a 
mutual to a stock charter.  Due to these significant biases, we do not directly rely on the 
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Preliminary evidence of the pricing variables is provided in Table VII.  The 
average ratio of offer price to book value of shares is 64.8 percent for non-MHCs and 
93.5 percent for MHCs.  Similarly, the average first day close price-to-book value of 
shares is 78.4 percent for non-MHCs and 112.3 percent for MHCs.  These significant 
differentials are evidence that thrift mutual holding companies have higher market 
valuation.  While a portion of the premium may be due to dividend policy, the premium 
may also be attributed to other benefits of the MHC structure or individual firm 
characteristics. 11  Table VII also presents the percent change in price on the first trading 
day.  Both MHCs and non-MHCs have similar average one-day stock price increases of 
approximately 20 percent.   
Next, cross-sectional analysis is used to investigate if the mutual holding company 
structure and subsequent dividend policy are significant determinants of higher pricing for 
MHCs.  We analyze the price-to-book ratio.  To calculate the price-to-book ratio we use 
the offer price as well as the price at the end of the first trading day. 12   
Consistent with previous research on depository institution pricing, we control for 
return-on-assets, equity-to-assets, and log of size 13 (Cheng, Gup, and Wall (1989), 
                                                                                                                                            
appraisal equations or the appraisal estimation reported in the proxy statements.  Later 
alternative ratios will be considered. 
11 Other benefits to minority shareholders may include the potential to dissolve the MHC 
shares.  Under the terms of a merger agreement between North Shore (non-MHC) and 
Marquette Savings Bank (MHC), North Shore agreed to buy each of the shares not 
owned by the MHC.  The MHC shares were cancelled.  The OTS approved this 
transaction in June (Gallagher 2000). 
12 We also included tests using the price after the 75th trading date to test the robustness 
of our results.  The results from this alternate model lead to similar interpretation and 
conclusions.   
13 Several authors also suggest a ratio of non-performing loans-to-assets.  We do not 
report using non-performing loans-to-assets in the model since missing observations 
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Rogowski and Simonson (1989), Frieder and Petty (1991), Rose (1991), Palia (1993), 
Fraser and Kolari (1988), Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996), and Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, 
and Nguyen (2000)).  The industry average price-to-book ratio controls for prevailing 
thrift market values.  This approach allows us to use the primary indicators utilized in prior 
banking studies and enhance the model using an industry comparable ratio that controls 
for changes in the market value of banking firms through time. 14  An indicator variable for 
insider holdings incorporates the potential for signaling (Leland and Pyle (1977)).  Studies 
by Ritter (1984), Kim, Krinsky, and Lee (1995), Klein (1996) and Van der Goot (1997) 
find that non-financial IPOs with a larger fraction of the equity retained by insiders have 
higher market valuations.       
In Table VIII, we report regression results using price-to-book as the dependent 
variable.  Models 1 and 3 use the offer price and Models 2 and 4 use the price at the close 
of the first trading day when calculating the price-to-book ratio.  Models 1 and 2 use two 
indicator variables to determine whether MHCs are priced significantly higher than non-
MHCs.  The first indicator variable is equal to one if the firm is a MHC and zero 
otherwise.  To test hypothesis 4, we define a second indicator variable that is equal to one 
if the firm is a MHC converting after February 1995 and zero otherwise.   
Both models 1 and 2 are highly significant, with adjusted R-squared values of 52 
percent and 41 percent, respectively.  Model 1 shows that firm size, inside ownership, and 
the industry average price-to-book ratio are significant control variables.  The price-to-
book value is lower for larger firms and firms with high inside ownership.  The price-to-
                                                                                                                                            
reduce our sample size.  However, models including non-performing loans result in 
similar conclusions. 
14 We obtain similar results when we remove the industry average price-to-book ratios 
and replace these values with yearly indicator variables (Brewer et al (2000)).   
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book is higher when the industry price-to-book ratio is higher.  Controlling for these 
factors, MHCs making an initial stock offer prior to the 1995 OTS ruling have a 
significantly higher price-to-book ratio than non-MHCs.  On average, the stock price of 
these MHCs has a 35 percent higher price-to-book value relative to non-MHCs.  MHCs 
that made their initial stock offering subsequent to the 1995 OTS ruling have a 12 percent 
lower price-to-book value than MHCs that made their initial stock offering prior to the 
1995 OTS ruling.  Thus, the premium drops from 35 percent prior to the OTS ruling to 23 
percent subsequent to the OTS ruling.  An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the sum of the 
two indicator variables is equal to zero.  The persistence of the premium may be due to the 
potential for lax enforcement, reversal of the ruling, or other benefits to the MHC 
structure. 15, 16 
The primary difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is that the price-to-book 
ratio is calculated using the closing price at the end of the first trading day.  In contrast to 
the results of Model 1, firm size and insider ownership are both insignificant.  This is 
consistent with greater underpricing for converting thrifts where insiders acquire greater 
holdings as documented by Maksimovic and Unal (1993) and Cox and Roden (1999).  
                                               
15 Based on the July 12, 2000 Federal Register, the OTS provided only lax enforcement 
of their dividend-policy regulation.  The article states that, although the OTS required 
some dilution for special or excess dividends, it typically did not require dilution for 
ordinary dividends.  The Federal Register also stated that after July 12, 2000, the “OTS 
will no longer require dilution for any waived dividend in a subsequent conversion to 
stock.”   
16 Alternatively, since the MHC depositor shares are not traded, assuming the value of the 
minority shares equals the value of the MHC depositor shares may create an upward bias 
in price-to-book ratios.  If MHC shares, as a dual-class of stock have a lower valuation, 
the indicator for MHCs would proxy for this difference.  Additional tests were also 
performed to ensure that alternative calculations of price-to-book ratios did not 
significantly influence the conclusions.  Even if the MHC depositor shares are assumed to 
have zero value when calculating price-to-book ratios, we obtain similar results. 
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Providing additional support for hypothesis 4, model 2 also shows that premiums decrease 
after February of 1995.   
Earlier we demonstrated how dividends could be used to transfer wealth from the 
MHC depositor-owners to the minority shareholders and we documented that MHCs pay 
significantly higher dividends than non-MHCs.  Given the potential for wealth transfer 
through dividend policy, Models 3 and 4 in Table VIII test whether dividend policy 
influences the value of MHCs.  In addition to the control variables and MHC indicator 
variable used in Models 1 and 2, we incorporate three new explanatory variables in 
Models 3 and 4. 17  The first new variable is equal to the dividend yield on non-MHCs and 
zero otherwise.  The second variable is equal to the dividend yield on MHCs that made 
their initial stock issuance prior to the February 1995 ruling and zero otherwise.  The third 
variable is equal to the dividend yield on MHCs that made their initial stock issuance after 
February 1995 and zero otherwise.  Dividends are defined as the annualized dividends 
from the first year subsequent to the conversion.  We define dividend yield as a percent of 
book value for two reasons.  First, as discussed earlier, Ohlson (1995) shows that 
dividends are paid out of a firm’s book value.  Second, since previous studies of dual-class 
stock find that differential dividend policy will impact the market value of the firm, 
defining dividends as a percentage of a firm’s current price would violate the assumption 
of independence. 
Model 3 shows that the dividend variables add explanatory power as is evidenced 
by the improved adjusted R-squared value. The results indicate that dividend policy is not 
an important indicator of valuation for non-MHCs; however, dividend policy does have a 
                                               
17 Due to significant problems with multicollinearity, the indicator for MHCs making 
their initial offering after 1995 is not included.   
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significant influence on MHC valuation.  As stated in hypothesis 5, dividends have a 
greater influence on prices prior to the 1995 OTS ruling; however, even after the 1995 
OTS ruling, investment banks priced dividend policy. 
In Model 4, the price-to-book ratio is based on the offering day closing price.  Prior 
to the 1995 OTS ruling investors consider dividend policy to be a significant factor in 
pricing MHCs.  The value of dividends was reduced after the OTS restricted dividend 
waivers.  Each of these findings supports the conclusion that waiving dividends can 
transfer wealth from the MHC owner-depositors to minority shareholders. 18   
While the previous analysis centers on price-to-book ratios, the results presented 
in Table IX reflect investigation of the impact of the MHC structure and dividend policy 
on stock price returns at the time of the conversion.  The dependent variable is equal to 
the one-day return at the initial public offering.  The control variables are the same as in 
the previous analysis with the addition of variables found significant by Maksimovic and 
Unal (1993) including the firm-specific price-to-book ratio at the offer date, the 
percentage change in the thrift index over the previous six weeks, and the percentage 
change in interest rates over the previous six weeks.  The results add further support for 
the interpretations based on Table VIII.  In Model 1 of Table IX, we show that MHCs 
                                               
18 Additional models, not reported in the tables, are tested to determine the robustness of 
our results.  Similar to prior studies [Kane and Unal (1990) and Flannery and Houston 
(1999)] we define the dependent variable as the stock price and include the existing set of 
independent variables as well as the book value of equity.  The results indicate that 
MHCs prior to February 1995 sold at a premium of $4.00 to $5.00 per share over non-
MHCs.  After 1995, the premium remained at approximately $2.00 per share.  
Furthermore, as in the previous results, the dividend yield is a significant determinant of 
MHC price prior to 1995, but not after the OTS ruling.  Price-earnings ratios were also 
considered as the dependent variable.  Using the same independent variables as in Table 
VIII, we find that MHCs have higher price-earnings ratios and price-earnings ratios are 
positively related to dividend yield prior to February 1995.   
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formed after the 1995 OTS ruling have significantly lower returns than MHCs that went 
public prior to 1995 (hypothesis 4).  In Model 2, we show that after 1995 higher 
dividends by MHCs resulted in significantly lower offer-day returns, consistent with 
investors placing a smaller value on dividends after the 1995 OTS ruling (hypothesis 
5). 19     
The significance of dividend policy on MHC offer-day returns and price-to-book 
ratios provide evidence of the value of dividends to minority shareholders when the OTS 
allowed MHCs to waive dividends without stock compensation.  While the significance of 
the offer-day returns could be due to initial mispricing, the finding that dividend yield is 
also a significant component of the price-to-book ratio calculated at the close of the offer 
day provides evidence that minority shareholders value dividends. 
B.4. Event Study Support 
To enhance the validity of our conclusions, we also use event-study methodology 
to test the significance of returns surrounding each of the OTS rulings.  We use a standard 
event-study methodology based on Brown and Warner (1985).  Our 100-day estimation 
period begins 5 days prior to the event.  We report cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for the day of and the day prior to the publication date.  In Table X, we report the number 
of firms used in the study, the mean CAR, the t-statistic testing if the CAR is significantly 
different from zero, the number of firms with positive and negative CARs, and a Z-statistic 
testing if the percent of positive returns is significantly different from 50%.   
                                               
19 These results are consistent with the results shown in Model 3 of Table VIII, where it 
appears that investment bankers continued to value the higher dividends when setting 
their offer-day price subsequent to the OTS ruling.  Investors, however, recognized that 
dividends were not a significant factor in determining prices subsequent to the OTS 
ruling as shown in Model 4 of Table VIII.   
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  On May 15, 1995, the OTS announced that MHCs must seek a dividend waiver 
on a case-by-case basis.  The OTS policy required that minority shareholders have their 
ownership proportionately decreased when a MHC waives its right to dividend payments.  
Companies in existence prior to February 1, were allowed to continue waiving dividends.  
The mean CAR surrounding this event was -0.38%, insignificantly different from zero.  
While this would be viewed as a negative event for new MHCs (hypothesis 6), given that 
existing MHCs were grandfathered under the prior regulations, an insignificant result is 
not surprising.   
On July 12, 2000, the OTS repealed their previous ruling and no longer required 
dilution for waived dividends.  Even though the OTC frequently waived dividends on a 
case-by-case basis prior to this date, the official ruling was well received by minority 
shareholders.  The average cumulative abnormal return for all MHCs on July 12, was 
0.59%, significant at the 5 percent level, with positive CARs for two-thirds of MHCs.  To 
further test the price reaction of the dividend ruling, we reduce the sample, eliminating 
firms grandfathered in the 1995 ruling and therefore unaffected by the new dividend 
policy.  For the 24 firms directly affected, the average CAR is 0.88%, significant at the 
10% level, with positive CARs for two-thirds of the sample.  The significant positive stock 
price reaction supports hypothesis 7 and provides additional evidence that dividend policy 
facilitates a transfer of wealth from MHC holders to minority shareholders.   
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Mutual holding companies are hybrid structures that facilitate conversion of a 
mutual to a stock company.  Experience in the thrift industry offers an opportunity to 
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investigate the effect of dividend policy on the value of MHCs and develop 
recommendations for all MHCs.  The potential growth of the MHC structure is great, 
with over 12,000 mutual financial institutions in the United States eligible to adopt the 
MHC structure.  The greatest growth potential lies with credit unions, which have 
successfully converted to mutual saving banks and subsequently formed MHCs to 
facilitate conversion to stock companies (Merrick (2001)).  With this two-stage process, 
the MHC structure is available to over 10,700 credit unions, 400 mutual thrifts, and 1,360 
mutual insurance companies. 20  
The incentives and opportunities for wealth transfer may be even greater for the 
mutual insurance industry than the mutual thrift industry.  On average, mutual insurance 
companies are much larger than mutual thrifts, allowing for greater wealth transfers.  In 
addition, insurance companies are regulated at the state level while thrifts are more 
centrally regulated.  State regulators and lawmakers may be more likely to rule for local 
insurance companies because many of the policyholders who could be harmed are likely 
to live outside of the state.  In fact, some mutual insurance companies have used the 
threat of moving their operations out of state while lobbying their state governments to 
allow the formation of mutual holding companies. 21   
We document that thrift MHCs have significantly higher dividends than thrifts 
undergoing full conversions.  Dividend yields are the highest for MHCs that went public 
prior to the 1995 OTS ruling, which required MHC depositor-owners to be compensated 
                                               
20 The mutual holding company structure has also been used in France, Germany, 
Austria, Canada, Netherlands, and Switzerland (Okuba, 1999).   
21 The passage of the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 allows any mutual company 
to re-domesticate their company into a state that allows the mutual holding company 
structure.   
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for waived dividends by increasing their ownership.  Not only do MHCs pay higher 
dividends, but dividend policy has a significant influence on the value of the minority 
shares.  The stock price of MHCs sells at a premium prior to 1995, when the MHC 
owner-depositors were not compensated for waived dividends.  Furthermore, dividend 
policy is a significant contributing factor to the premium paid for MHCs, but not a 
significant factor for pricing non-MHCs.  Although it appears that investment bankers 
continued to value higher dividends when setting MHC offer-day prices subsequent to the 
1995 OTS ruling, investors recognized that dividends were no longer a significant 
valuation factor after the ruling.  These results are consistent with dividend policy 
transferring wealth from MHC depositor-owners to minority stockholders in the absence 
of regulation. 
On July 12, 2000 the OTS proposed the relaxation of regulations on dividends for 
mutual holding companies, resulting in a significant positive abnormal return for MHC 
minority stockholders.  The positive abnormal return provides additional evidence of the 
potential for wealth transfer from MHC depositor-owners to minority stockholders.   
Our findings demonstrate that consistently enforced regulations of dividend 
payments to minority shareholders of MHCs are needed to prevent the transfer of wealth 
from MHC depositor-owners to minority shareholders.  Based on these results, we 
recommend both insurance and thrift regulators require equal dividend payments to each 
class of stockholders or compensation through increased ownership for MHCs that waive 
dividends. 
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Table I 
Example of Wealth Transfer through Dividends 
  
Full 
Demutualization 
Mutual Holding Company 
OTS Policy 
(Before 1995 and after 2000) 
Mutual Holding Company 
OTS Policy 
(Between 1995 and 2000) 
 
Year 
All 
Shareholders 
(2 shares) 
MHC 
Holders 
(1 Share) 
Minority 
Shareholders 
(1 Share) 
 
Combined 
(2 Shares) 
MHC 
Holders 
(1 Share) 
Minority 
Shareholders 
(1 Share) 
 
Combined 
(2 Shares) 
1 $0.50 $0 $0.25 $0.25 $0 $0.25 $0.25 
2 0.50 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 
3 0.50 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 
4 0.50 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 
5 20.00 10.64 10.64 21.28 11.28 10.00 21.28 
PV @ 10% $14.00 $6.60 $7.40 $14.00 $7.00 $7.00 $14.00 
Value/Share $7.00 $6.60 $7.40 $7.00 $7.00 $7.00 $7.00 
Value % 100% 47% 53% 100% 50% 50% 100% 
Premium   6%   0%  
 
 
 
 
 
Table II 
Mutual-to-Stock Conversions by Year 
 
Year 
All  
MHC Conversions 
All  
Full Conversions 
MHC Conversions 
in Final Sample 
Full Conversions 
in Final Sample 
1988 1 14 1 12 
1989 0 3 0 2 
1990 0 8 0 5 
1991 0 9 0 4 
1992 5 24 4 19 
1993 7 41 5 37 
1994 15 57 14 45 
1995 6 57 6 51 
1996 2 56 2 53 
1997 4 29 4 28 
1998 14 38 13 30 
1999 9 17 8 15 
2000 4 10 4 10 
Total 64 329 61 311 
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Table III 
Sample Statistics for non-MHCs and MHCs 
1988 – 2000 
The Wilcoxon Rank-Sums, Two-Sample test is used to test for statistical difference in means.  Significance 
for the two-sided test at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 Non-
MHCs 
 
MHCs 
 
Z-value 
 
P-value 
# of firms 311 61   
Ownership retained by MHC 0% 59.05%   
NASDAQ traded 78.78% 78.69% -0.01 .9883 
Pre-conversion total assets (000s) $343,065 $643,866 2.73*** .0064 
Conversion proceeds (000s) $42,420 $30,375 -5.16*** .0001 
Pre-conversion equity (000s) $24,437 $61,162 4.43*** .0001 
Conversion proceeds-to-pre-conversion equity 1.8162 0.5308 -10.92*** .0001 
Pre-conversion equity-to-assets 7.80% 9.71% 4.30*** .0001 
Pro-forma equity-to-assets 22.11% 14.57% -6.01*** .0001 
Pro-forma return-on-assets 0.59% 0.78% 2.52** .0121 
Inside ownership in dollars (000s) $1,872 $1,849 -1.44 .1505 
Inside ownership purchased  8.37% 6.19% -2.76*** .0058 
% of firms with > 5% inside ownership purchased 65.27% 54.10% -1.65* .0981 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV 
Dividend Behavior of non-MHCs and MHCs 
Dividend behavior is measured in the first year after demutualization.  Dividends yield is the company’s 
first declared dividend annualized and divided by the company’s book value per share.  The Wilcoxon 
Rank-Sums, Two-Sample test is used to test for statistical difference in means.  Significance for the two-
sided test at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 Non-
MHCs 
 
MHCs 
 
Z-value 
 
P-value 
     
# of Firms 311 61   
Proportion of Companies Paying a Dividend 73.63% 93.44% 3.35*** .0008 
Dividend/Book Value (Dividend Yield) for All Firms 1.43% 3.33% 8.07*** .0001 
     
# of firms that Pay a Dividend 229 57   
Dividend/Book Value (Dividend Yield) for Firms that Pay Dividends  1.94% 3.56% 7.66*** .0001 
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Table V 
Analysis of Dividend Policy using Cross Sectional Regression 
The dependent variable is equal to (dividends per share divided by the book value per share) x 100, where 
dividend is the company’s first declared dividend annualized.  For a mutual holding company the number 
of shares outstanding includes the shares held by minority stockholders and the shares held by the mutual 
holding company.  Models 1 and 2 include the full sample.  Model 3 limits the sample to dividend paying 
companies.  ROA is calculated as (pro-forma net income divided by pro forma assets) x 100.  Equity-to-
assets is calculated as (pro-forma equity divided by pro-forma assets) x 100.  Size is proxied by the log of 
pro-forma assets.  MHC is an indicator variable equal to one for mutual holding companies and zero 
otherwise. MHC after 1995 is an indicator variable equal to one for mutual holding companies that made 
their initial stock offering after February 1995 and zero otherwise.  P-values are provided in parentheses.  
Statistical significances at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Intercept 
 
0.7234 
(.3539) 
1.0445 
(.1655) 
1.9097** 
(.0125) 
    
ROA 
 
0.4269 
(.0004)*** 
0.3222 
(.0060)*** 
0.3168 
(.0201)** 
    
Equity-to-Assets 
 
0.0264*** 
(.0001) 
0.0309*** 
(.0001) 
0.0118 
(.0925)* 
    
Log of Assets 
 
-0.0110 
(.8551) 
-0.0407 
(.4829) 
-0.0394 
(.5099) 
    
MHC 
 
2.0253*** 
(.0001) 
3.1593*** 
(.0001) 
2.4980*** 
(.0001) 
    
MHC after 1995 
 
 -1.7588*** 
(.0001) 
-1.3241*** 
(.0001) 
    
R2 .3084 .3623 .3487 
Adjusted R2 .3009 .3536 .3340 
F-value 40.91 41.60 29.59 
P-value .0001 .0001 .0001 
Observations 372 372 286 
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Table VI 
Change in Dividend Behavior within Firms as a Result of 1995 OTS Ruling 
In order to obtain consistent reporting of when dividends were paid relative to the OTS enforcement date, 
the sample is restricted to thrifts with data available on CRSP.  If the firm paid semi-annually (quarterly, 
annually) prior to February 1, 1995 they were also required the firm to pay semi-annually (quarterly, 
annually) after February 1, 1995.  Significance for T-value at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level 
are denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 MHCs Non-MHCs 
   
Firms paying dividends 8 42 
   
Firms increasing dividend per share 4 33 
Percent increasing dividend per share 0.5000 0.7857 
    T-value that the two proportions increasing dividends are equal -1.995*** 
   
Firms decreasing dividend per share 4 6 
Percent decreasing dividend per share 0.5000 0.1429 
    T-value that the two proportions decreasing dividends are equal  3.000*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII 
Pricing Information for non-MHCs and MHCs 
The book value per share is the pro-forma book value, incorporating the expected proceeds from the 
offering.  For non-MHCs, the number of shares outstanding equals the shares issued.   For MHCs, the 
number of shares outstanding includes the shares held by minority stockholders and the shares held by the 
mutual holding company.  The Wilcoxon Rank-Sums Two-Sample test is used to test for statistical 
difference in means.  Significance for the two sided test at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level are 
denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 Non-
MHCs 
 
MHCs 
 
Z-value 
 
P-value 
     
# of firms 311 61   
Price-to-Book based on offer price 64.79% 93.50% 8.49 .0001*** 
Price-to-Book based on 1st Day Close 78.42% 112.32% 6.79 .0001*** 
Change in Price on 1st Day. 20.29% 19.90% -1.21 .2273 
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Table VIII 
Analysis of Price-to-Book Ratios using Cross-Sectional Regression: 
The dependent variable is equal to (the stock price divided by the company’s pro-forma book value per 
share) x 100.  For a mutual holding company the number of shares outstanding includes shares held by 
minority stockholders and shares held by the mutual holding company.  Models 1 and 3 define the stock 
price as the offer price and Models 2 and 4 define the stock price as the closing price at the end of the first 
day of trading.  ROA is calculated as (pro-forma net income divided by pro-forma assets) x 100.  Equity-to-
assets is calculated as (pro-forma equity divided by pro-forma assets) x 100.  Size is proxied by the log of 
pro-forma assets.  Industry price-to-book is the average for all thrifts with available data on SNL at the 
beginning of the year in which the offer was made.  MHC is an indicator variable equal to one for mutual 
holding companies and zero otherwise. MHC after 1995 is an indicator variable equal to one for mutual 
holding companies that made their initial stock offering after February 1995 and zero otherwise.   Dividend 
yield is calculated as (dividends per share divided by the book value per share) x 100, where dividends are 
equal to the company’s first annualized dividend subsequent to the demutualization.  The first dividend 
variable is equal to the dividend yield for non-MHCs and zero otherwise.  The second dividend variable is 
equal to dividend yield for MHCs that made an initial stock offering prior to February 1, 1995.  The third 
dividend variable is equal to dividend yield for MHCs making an initial stock offering after February 1, 
1995.  P-values are provided in parentheses.  Statistical significances at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Price-to-Book 
Offering 
Price 
Price-to-Book 
1st Trading 
Day Price 
Price-to-Book 
Offering 
Price 
Price-to-Book 
1st Trading 
Day Price 
     
Intercept 69.6980*** 
(.0001) 
28.2964* 
(.0949) 
67.9363*** 
(.0001) 
24.7130 
(.1439) 
ROA 2.2809* 
(.0743) 
2.8263 
(.1825) 
1.7365 
(.1618) 
2.3679 
(.2680) 
Equity-to-Assets 0.1906** 
(.0212) 
0.6285*** 
(.0001) 
0.1670** 
(.0400) 
0.6023*** 
(.0001) 
Log of Assets -1.8780*** 
(.0076) 
0.6893 
(.5537) 
-1.7688*** 
(.0086) 
0.9358 
(.4177) 
Inside Ownership > 5% -6.9360*** 
(.0001) 
-1.6881 
(.5223) 
-6.7220*** 
(.0001) 
-1.1757 
(.6529) 
Industry Price-to-Book 0.1704*** 
(.0001) 
0.2787*** 
(.0001) 
0.1686*** 
(.0001) 
0.2726*** 
(.0001) 
MHC 34.6843*** 
(.0001) 
43.9659*** 
(.0001) 
11.0110*** 
(.0025) 
22.1679*** 
(.0004) 
MHC after February 1, 1995 -11.8143*** 
(.0010) 
-16.5682*** 
(.0054) 
  
Dividend Yield for Non-MHCs   0.9342 
(.1483) 
1.2072 
(.2781) 
Dividend Yield for MHC prior to 
February 1, 1995 
  5.8473*** 
(.0001) 
5.1234*** 
(.0011) 
Dividend Yield for MHC after 
February 1, 1995 
  4.7926*** 
(.0001) 
2.8556 
(.1216) 
     
R2 .5217 .4117 .5611 .4190 
Adjusted R2 .5125 .4004 .5502 .4045 
F-value 56.71 36.40 51.42 29.00 
P-value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
Observations 372 372 372 372 
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Table IX 
Analysis of Price Increases at the Offer Date using Cross-Sectional Regression: 
The dependent variable is equal to the one-day return at the initial public offering x 100.  ROA is calculated as (pro-
forma net income divided by pro-forma assets) x 100.  Equity-to-assets which is calculated as (pro-forma equity 
divided by pro-forma assets) x 100.  Size is proxied by the log of pro-forma assets.  Industry price-to-book is the 
average for all thrifts with available data on SNL at the beginning of the year in which the offer was made.  Price-to-
book is defined as the offering price divided by pro-forma book value per share.  The thrift index change is equal to the 
percentage change in the equal-weighted thrift index over the previous six weeks (30 trading days) using all thrifts 
available on the CRSP tapes, and interest rate change is the percentage change in interest rates over the previous six 
weeks.  MHC is an indicator variable equal to one for mutual holding companies and zero otherwise. MHC after 1995 
is an indicator variable equal to one for mutual holding companies that made their initial stock offering after February 
1995 and zero otherwise.   Dividend yield is calculated as (dividends per share divided by the book value per share) x 
100, where dividends are equal to the company’s first annualized dividend subsequent to the demutualization.  The first 
dividend variable is equal to the dividend yield for non-MHCs and zero otherwise.  The second dividend variable is 
equal to dividend yield for MHCs that made an initial stock offering prior to February 1, 1995 and zero otherwise.  The 
third dividend variable is equal to dividend yield for MHCs making an initial stock offering after February 1, 1995 and 
zero otherwise.  P-values are provided in parentheses.  Statistical significances at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 One-Day 
Return at the 
IPO Date 
One-Day 
Return at the 
IPO Date 
   
Intercept -84.7782*** 
(.0001) 
-90.9567*** 
(.0001) 
ROA 0.1534 
(.9230) 
0.4774 
(.7640) 
Equity-to-Assets 0.5304*** 
(.0001) 
0.5408*** 
(.0001) 
Log of Assets 4.3560*** 
(.0001) 
4.6408*** 
(.0001) 
Inside Ownership > 5% 8.8343*** 
(.0001) 
9.5915*** 
(.0001) 
Industry Price-to-Book 0.1518** 
(.0374) 
0.1385*** 
(.0002) 
Price-to-Book at the Offer Date 
 
0.2055*** 
(.0016) 
0.2640*** 
(.0001) 
Thrift Index Change 1.4485*** 
(.0001) 
1.4683** 
(.0001) 
Interest Rate Change -0.4431*** 
(.0023) 
-0.4268*** 
(.0031) 
MHC 3.5821 
(.3927) 
5.2848 
(.2052) 
MHC after February 1, 1995 -9.3289** 
(.0367) 
 
Dividend Yield for Non-MHCs 
 
 -0.5274 
(.5215)         
Dividend Yield for MHC prior to February 1, 1995 
 
 -1.5309 
(.2087)       
Dividend Yield for MHC after February 1, 1995 
 
 -4.2996*** 
(.0022)         
   
R2 .3416 .3528 
Adjusted R2 .3234 .3312 
F-value 18.73 16.31 
P-value .0001 .0001 
Observations 372 372 
 36 
Table X 
Abnormal Returns Surrounding OTS Rulings 
Estimated equation:
it
j
jjimtiiit eDRbaR +++= ∑
−=
0
1
,γ .  Rmt is the value-weighted index.  The event window 
spans two days, including the day prior to the OTC ruling.  The estimation period is 100 days, ending 5 
days prior to the event.   
 
 
 
Event Dates 
 
 
 
N 
Mean 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return (-1, 0) 
 
 
 
t-statistic 
 
 
 
Pos : Neg 
 
 
Z-statistica 
for signs test 
      
May 15, 1995 
Prohibited MHCs from 
waiving dividends 
21 -0.38% 0.58 10:11 -0.22 
      
July 12, 2000 
OTS allows waiver of 
dividends (All MHCs) 
30 0.59%** 1.99 20:10 1.83* 
      
July 12, 2000 
OTS allows waiver of 
dividends (MHCs not 
previously grandfathered) 
24 0.82%* 1.79 16:8 1.63 
a The z-statistic is determined as, )1(*/)*( ppNpNG −− , where G is the number of positive 
parameter estimates, N is the total number of parameter estimates, and p is the probability of a positive 
estimate (0.50).  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 
